It is clear that Pakistan must reassess the strategy it has adopted to counter insurgencies both in Balochistan (KP) and Balochistan.
The worst I can be is still not the worst.
“This is the worst. ” — Edgar, King Lear Act 4, Scene 1.
AESOP FABLE
One day, a gnat in the savannah woke to bright sunshine. He was proud and felt great. He thought, “What a great day for some stinging.” He was buzzing about when he saw a lion. The lion became annoyed. “What’s your problem?” asked the cheeky gnat. “You are king of all beasts, but I don’t fear you.” The lion replied: “I could destroy you in one swipe with my paw.” The gnat kept buzzing and said, “You can’t.” The lion tried to swat at the insect, but it would escape him.
It then stung the lion with its annoying gnat. The lion tried his best to remove the annoying insect, but he was unsuccessful. He said “Okay, concede” and the gnat took off, happy that he’d defeated the powerful lion. The gnat thought to itself, “I’m deserving of a house fit for a King.” A web is draped on a bush. It was the perfect place to relax. When the gnat slid into the web of the spider, it laughed, saying, “Ha! You are stuck!”
How dare you. “I am the king of beasts. “Even the lion gave me his territory,” said the gnat. No, that’s not true. “You are trapped, little gnat. You can’t leave unless I allow you to,” the spider said. It kept trying to escape but was unable. He eventually conceded, and told the spider “Please let go.” “I won’t boast and I won’t bother anyone.”
The fable is a good lesson to learn as we see a rise in terror attacks. Jaffar express in Balochistan, and Bannu Cantonment in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are just two examples.
In recent times, the terrorist attack in Balochistan on March 11, on the Jaffar express train was not the only high-profile incident. Pakistan’s strategy for countering insurgency in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan has to be re-evaluated in light of the near-daily attacks against security forces and civils. Ejaz Haifer explains what to do…
Setting the Premis
The lion’s claw cannot be used to whack elusive adversaries. A spider’s net is a metaphor that represents a set of tactics that includes both kinetic and a non-kinetic approach.
The mountain of literature about counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations should make it clear that this is easier said than done. RAND, for example, has conducted studies that show only 11 of 71 insurgencies in the past 70 years have been won by COIN forces.
There are many reasons why there is a low success rate. One of them has to do with the fact that we try to simplify complex problems when making decisions. Let’s first examine the challenges Pakistan faces in KP, Balochistan. Since the mid-1990s, low-intensity violence has been raging in both provinces.
While both cases can be defined as violent, it’s important to examine them separately because groups in each province fighting against the state have a different ideology and motivation and should therefore be dealt with differently.
Hans Morgenthau, a German-American Political Scientist who taught at the University of Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s told his students: “Appeasement can be a good strategy to deal with the autonomist movements – i.e. give them self-government inside the existing state – but it is the worst strategy for those that are determined to take over the state.”
Morgenthau compared territorial aggressors to a limited ambition: If their border adjustments are possible, they can be done (medieval European Wars is a great example). Appeasement can be disastrous if they have an unquenchable appetite (the case of Hitler’s appeasement).
Hundreds of military operations, both small and large scales, have had mixed results. Many tactical victories have also been lost, but the strategic goal of disincentivizing groups that fight the state has eluded this country. The fact that this has happened is a source of much criticism. Many of the criticisms are justified, but many others stem from selective facts or a desire for a solution that is final — homeostasis.
A FAILURE IN STRATEGIC MANNER
The results of hundreds of military operations, both large and small-scaled, have been mixed. Many tactical victories have also been lost, but the strategic goal of disincentivizing groups that fight the state has eluded this country. The fact that this has happened is causing a great deal of criticism. Many of the criticisms are justified, but many others stem from selective facts or a desire for a solution that is final — homeostasis in which everything is back to normal.
It is not surprising that this view of KP’s situation has been misconstrued for at least two reasons. Pakistan reached its current dysbiotic condition by acting and responding to external stimuli. Balochistan has, however, moved away from the internal chaos to an externally exploited situation.
There’s no way to ignore the past. It’s not possible. Tabula rasa The slate is not a blank one. The ecosystem has been affected by events and turning points. In a 1973 article, Professors Horst Rittel & Melvin Webber showed that the ecosystem is affected by events and inflection points. Policy SciencesThe search for scientific basis for tackling problems in social policy will fail.
It is true that all policies are not objectively and definitively right or wrong. Rittel and Webber refer to them as wicked problems.
Why? Answer: interactive complexity. The effects of dealing with one aspect of complexity can affect other aspects of the system. Let’s first look at the KP case and Balochistan to see why the problem persists.
The Case of Balochistan
To deal with the separatist issue in Balochistan, the Federation must first determine the causality. Is Balochistan an issue of political or COIN/CT? What is the cause of what?
The province should have a real political process if the problem is principally a result of a bad political situation. This won’t eliminate insurgency/terrorism, but is an essential condition to be met before moving on. The federation is completely tone deaf about this.
Balochistan has been treated by successive governments as a CT issue. Because of this approach, which lacks genuine political representation, the security agencies and intelligence agencies have been given priority. By their very nature, the security forces are the sledgehammer of the state. This leads to a bias towards using force. It is called the Law of the Instrument.
Balochistan has a serious terrorism issue, which is a weapon used by separatists. This is not going to go away. It must be addressed. The state is now sponsoring it, including India. How should it be dealt with by the state?
The state can continue being unrelentingly brutal and claim that Balochs simply don’t possess the numbers necessary to win. If the issue is political, and the terrorism that results from the warped socio-economic and political choices of the establishment, kinetic operations without a credible process could not only harm the resolution but also be counterproductive.
CT operations should be based on discrimination and superior intelligence, and field forces that are highly disciplined. Forces operating on the ground should be held accountable by the ruling political party. The security forces do not like to lose their own personnel. After such an attack, revenge is a strong desire. That’s understandable. At that point, leaders and commanders need to show patience and restraint.
In addition to the three points above, it is absolutely necessary and unavoidable that we distinguish between Baloch groups who are fighting for their rights and those who peacefully demand them and the Baloch people. In times of violence and high emotions, it is easy to confuse peaceful protests with terrorist acts. This is one of the worst mistakes a CT/COIN unit can make.
It is more important to keep moderates as moderates than to try to convert extremists. The non-violent are pushed towards violence when peaceful protestors are treated crassly. This is COIN/CT 101.
Terrorist groups resort to audacious violence to provoke governments to respond ruthlessly and without discrimination against the ethnic groups they belong to. These reprisals encourage the terrorist groups to recruit more members from these populations. This creates a cycle of violence.
The Baloch Yakjehti Committee, led by Dr Mahrang Baloch, is a good example. BYC, a peaceful group that demands rights and an end to forced disappearances as well as a fair distribution of resources is the BYC. All of these demands are constitutionally valid and perfectly legal. This federation mismanaged the movement by accusing them of being a political arm of BLA.
Even if this accusation were accepted for argument’s sake, it still shows, despite BLA’s violence and other acts of violence, that there is still room for a dialogue on politics, especially given BYC’s public image. History also tells us all of these movements are divided into moderate and extremist factions. The BYC would be in a bad position if current anger led to the persecution of BYC members, as I am afraid it might. This could play into the hands the BLA who are the face of Baloch Resistance.
What is the best way to deal with BLAs? So far, I’ve argued in favor of a CT discriminatory policy. Add a dash of brutality to the mix. By ruthlessness, I refer to the relentless pursuit of BLA safehouses, training camps and supply routes as well as ingress and exit routes.
The holistic approach also includes this aspect. It is just as important for Balochistan, to have authentic representation – not the fake one that exists now – and for the Federation to address the Baloch’s demands.
AP
The Case of KP
Afghanistan is the heartland of fitna al-khawarij, the various islamist terrorist groups often grouped under the Tehreek-i-Taliban umbrella (TTP). This also applies to Baloch terrorist organizations. The problem has worsened since the Tehreek i Talban Afghanistan (TTA) took over Afghanistan.
Kabul provides a safe haven for the Khawarij, and they are even supported militarily by Kabul during border clashes. Kabul is also involved in dealing with FaK. Pakistan may pursue recent diplomatic efforts to reach a solution, but it must also be transparent about TTA’s intentions.
What can be done to deter Afghanistan from attacking? It is a serious problem. Afghanistan is a country in the modern sense of that word. In perspective, Afghanistan does not compare to India or Iran. Both are far more powerful than Afghanistan, but they’re vulnerable because of the economic, infrastructure and military losses that would result from a conflict.
Deterrence works, then, when the states have similar configurations. The goal is to keep the current status quo. Deterrence in this sense is an absence of action.
Signaling resolve and demonstrating capability is part of the process. Pakistan’s response inside Iran after Iran had attacked an Iranian target on Pakistani soil last year is a good example. Pakistan’s response showed its determination to Iran, and implicitly to India. By indicating it didn’t want an escalation of the conflict, Pakistan also gave Tehran a way out. The carrot must be accompanied by the stick.
This is the mixture of positive and negative inducements.
Afghanistan differs from other countries in this regard. It impacts any policy of retaliation that assumes a strike back will create deterrence. This won’t happen unless we identify pain points which can be targeted in order to increase the cost of the TTA leaders housing FaK, and then using them against Pakistan.
Another point that is related to this one concerns the costs for Pakistan of an unthinking retaliatory strategy. This scenario could be described as follows: TTA is mulish, and FaK continues to aid them. FaK launches terrorist attacks. Some are stopped; others continue. Pakistan retaliates. TTA responds from across the border. Then it starts again. It will not deter Kabul but instead degenerate in to dispiriting cycle of violence. The official declaration that an individual target has been/has been struck and neutralised does not achieve political-strategic goals.
Costs — both direct and indirect — will continue to rise in Pakistan as a result of these cycles: instabilities in affected areas, deaths, preparation and monitoring of defences, constant surveillance, ammo expenditure (from small arms and light weapons, to mortars, howitzers, and field artillery), use of aerial platforms, (calculated by the cost of fighter jets’ operational flight per hour, which can reach thousands of dollars), etc. The net result is failure to deter.
Afghanistan does not have a lot of targets. TTA as well as FaK are both expendable. No shortage of recruits is available to replace those we have killed. The low intensity conflict that FaK fights doesn’t require large numbers. Attrition can be achieved without large numbers. The psychology behind the gradual accumulation of body mass is affected by this.
Then, what is important? Infrastructure? Infrastructure? Locations strategically important? Cantonments for military purposes? Can command and control centers be compromised? What about dams, grids and power lines? Some of it, but not much. Poverty can be a strong barrier against an escalating state that seeks to deter through dominance.
What is the difference between an attack and a capture? As the US discovered, it’s easy-peasy. You’ll be packing and moving out in 20 years, when you realise that only creatures from hell can inhabit hell. Pakistan cannot leave its neighbourhood. It’s an evil problem. Action is more than just reacting to an attack. What’s the solution?
Let’s first acknowledge we have a serious problem. We are committed to this long-term endeavor, and CT operations represent a new kind of warfare. It’s impossible to define a clear point of success. It is possible to achieve a pre-diabetic state of violence, which requires diligence and healthy living.
This conflict also requires national participation because the site of conflict, the people’s sympathies, is the one that is being contested. This requires the constitutional legitimacy of the government and system. It is better to say as little about this issue in the present context.
For the long term, you will need to have a policy that combines overt and non-kinetic actions. Such a policy should have both offensive and defensive components: be proactive and preemptive when needed, and strengthen the defensive component.
The fourth step is to move away from the simple dealings with FaK, and hold the TTA accountable for FaK actions. TTA’s action directly against Pakistani forces, and its strategy to use the FaK against Pakistan as leverage opens up the possibility of any indirect or direct action. The Schwerpunkt, to use Clausewitz’s term. [focus of effort] The TTA is the only way to go.
For this policy to be effective, it must first identify the TTA’s problems and then focus on them. It is important to stress this, as it’s central to deterrence strategies whether they are based on punishment or denial. Polititicians who are aware of the whole picture will be able to identify these points. It is important to remember that a physical approach may not be necessary in all cases.
In this type of irregular conflict the most important requirement is top-notch intelligence. In relation to an operation, the type of platform used for kinetic actions is important. However, actionable intelligence that identifies targets takes precedence.
These approaches will require both overt and concealment actions. There’s no need to list covert action, but it is possible. Veteran intelligence workers understand how covert action can be used to create psychological and degradation pressure.
Since we will be in the game for a long time, it is advisable to train, develop and deploy an army that has been specifically trained to perform the tasks of border monitoring, patrolling and defense. The Frontier Corps is technically supposed to be doing this. The non-commissioned officers are also good fighters but they need to be trained better.
The FC does not have the capabilities or resources to conduct offensive CT across the border. The FC is the basis for my proposed force and we should not reinvent the wheel.
It is also crucial to train the FC and review its operational guidelines, as regular army soldiers are already overstretched. War is a sport with different goals, objectives and strategies, just like cricket. FC is the best team to represent this format. The same applies to CT operations in KP.
The central issue is that policymakers must go beyond retaliatory and insignificant strikes to formulate a long-term, comprehensive policy for dealing with the problem.
Kabul provides refuge to Afghan refugees.
AFP
Can we do it?
No and yes. If we are able to think “more sophisticatedly”, then yes. But if not, we will fail “to see a problem in its context.”
The book was published in 1989. Failure is a logical conclusion In the English edition of 1996, Dietrich Dorner (Professor Emeritus of psychology at the University of Bamberg) established, through computer simulations, that humans think linearly. They fail to understand that ecosystems (natural and otherwise), are made up of countless interrelated subsystems. A change in one part can affect other parts.
Dorner says, “Failure is not a sudden event; it happens gradually and according to logic.” We will observe that complex situations tend to trigger habits of thinking that are a precursor to failure.
The Tanaland Problem is what I refer to, based on the computer simulation created by Dorner.
Twelve participants were asked to help improve the life of a village in Africa. Participants were given unlimited resources and dictatorial power to achieve this. All of them would have seemed to be successful.
The truth is that no one did. Tanaland, after initial gains in life expectancy and agricultural production, ended up almost without water. Why?
Participants acted before a comprehensive analysis was done. This led to a failure of the participants to predict side effects and long-term consequences of their policy according to initial hypotheses. They believed that they were right because certain things had improved, and no negative consequences were immediately apparent. This created a cognitive distortion and made them blind to new needs and situations. Tanaland was hit by drought and famine. Participants reacted with cynicism.
Where do I go from here?
George Orwell, in his brilliant essay titled ‘Politics and the English Language,’ wrote:[A]A cause can be an effect, which reinforces the cause of the effect and intensifies it. This cycle continues indefinitely. “A man might drink to cope with his failure and fail even more because of it.”
Here’s a different take on it. Coercion is sometimes used by a state that believes it’s being attacked subversively and that this will weaken them. Then, they become weaker as the only option left to them is to oppress and coerce those who are supposed to be its strongest. A’motive-based approach’ is clearly superior to an iron-fist approach because it focuses on the motivations of insurgents instead of just killing them.
We must now consider the question of governance and not only governance. These benchmarks have been established: transparency, participation and accountability. These benchmarks are presupposed by a democratic regime, and it should be obvious that if they were met in a given state’s ecosystem would not have been thrown out of whack. A strong state, not a rigid one.
The 1995 Book Arab States are overstatedThe late Egyptian political analyst Nazih Ayubi distinguished between “hard” and “strong” states. Ayubi claimed that authoritarian Arab countries had limited ability to influence trends, populations and change, and therefore could not enforce law and disrupt traditional structures. Strong states achieve their goals by being accepted by the people. The hard state is a coercive state. Ayubi said, “the Arab state is violent because it’s weak.”
Strong state is a partner with citizens. The relationship between the state and society is mutually beneficial. According to economists Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, the strength of a strong state is its ability “to work with other centres of social power.” The Narrow CoridorThe path to freedom must be free of tyranny and anarchy.
Were we able to become a powerful state without pledging that it would be hard? You are as good as me, my dear reader.
This writer is an experienced journalist who has a keen interest in foreign and security policies. X: @ejazhaider
Dawn EOS March 30, 2025
